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Abstract
We investigate four well-known negative translations of classical logic into
intuitionistic logic within a substructural setting. We find that in affine logic the
translation schemes due to Kolmogorov and Go¨del both satisfy Troelstra’s criteria
for a negative translation. On the other hand, the schemes of Glivenko and Gentzen
both fail for affine logic, but for different reasons: one can extend affine logic to
make Glivenko work and Gentzen fail and vice versa. By contrast, in the setting
of Łukasiewicz logic, we can prove a general result asserting that a wide class of
formula translations including those of Kolmogorov, Go¨del, Gentzen and Glivenko
not only satisfy Troelstra’s criteria with respect to a natural intuitionistic fragment
of Łukasiewicz logic but are all equivalent.
1 Introduction
Negative translations (also known as double negation translations) have a long history
in logic and proof theory. Kolmogorov [14] was probably the first one to observe that
classical logic can be “embedded” into its intuitionistic fragment. He defined a transla-
tionA 7→ AK which places double negations in front of every subformula, and showed
thatA is provable classically if and only ifAK is provable intuitionistically. Around the
same time, Glivenko [10], Go¨del [11] and Gentzen [8] defined more “economic” trans-
lations that also eliminate classical principles from proofs at the cost of introducing
extra negations, but not as many as Kolmogorov’s.
In the present paper we recast these negative translations in the setting of substruc-
tural logic, concentrating on logics lying between intuitionistic affine ALi logic and
classical Łukasiewicz logic ŁLc. This will shed light on the amount of contraction
required in order to make the translations work.
In Section 2, we define a fragment of classical Łukasiewicz logic ŁLc, which we
will call intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic1 ŁLi. Just as Łukasiewicz logic [12] is a
subsystem of classical logic CL, intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic is a subsystem of the
usual intuitionistic logic IL [19]. This paper focuses on propositional logic, leaving a
similar study for predicate logic to future work.
1Our reasons for adopting this terminology are given in Section 6.
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ALi −−−−→ ŁLi −−−−→ IL
Figure 1: Relationships between the six logics
ŁLi and ŁLc are defined here as extensions of the {⊸,⊗,⊥}-fragment of intu-
itionistic affine logicALi, i.e. intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic [1, 3, 9] extended
by allowing weakening. A similar sequent calculus for Łukasiewicz logic based on
classical affine logic has been proposed in [6]. The main differences are that we work
on the implication-conjunction fragment of affine logic, and take intuitionistic affine
logic as the starting point.
Starting from ALi one obtains intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic ŁLi by adjoining
the axiom that we call commutativity of weak conjunction [CWC]
A⊗ (A⊸ B) ⊢ B ⊗ (B ⊸ A)
which is a simple consequence of contraction, but is strictly weaker than it. The reason
we call A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) a weak form of conjunction can be explained as follows:
Note that A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) implies both A and B, but without contraction (so that A
can be used twice), we do not have in general A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) ⊢ A ⊗ B. On the
other hand, due to the presence of weakening in the affine systems, we always have
A ⊗ B ⊢ A ⊗ (A ⊸ B). Hence, A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) is a form of conjunction strictly
weaker than the usual multiplicative conjunction A ⊗ B. The axiom states that this
conjunction is commutative. It is also known as the axiom of divisibility in the basic
logic literature [13].
The logic ŁLi has been studied before, under different names. For instance, Blok
and Ferreirim [4] refer to it as SHO . ŁLi can also be viewed as a fragment of Ha´jek’s
basic logic without the (intuitionistically unacceptable) axiom of pre-linearity [12]
(A⊸ B)⊸ C, (B ⊸ A)⊸ C ⊢ C
The relationship between the various logical systems is depicted as a commutative
diagram in Figure 1, where arrows indicate inclusion.
The intuitionistic systems ALi and ŁLi have “classical” counterparts (ALc and
ŁLc, respectively) obtained by adding the law of double negation elimination [DNE]
A⊥⊥ ⊢ A
where A⊥ is defined as A⊸ ⊥.
In order to move horizontally in the diagram of Figure 1 from the left-most column
(affine system) to the right-most column (intuitionistic IL, and classical logic CL) one
adds the contraction axiom [CON]
A ⊢ A⊗A
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Γ, A ⊢ B
[⊸I]
Γ ⊢ A⊸ B
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ A⊸ B
[⊸E]
Γ,∆ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ B
[⊗I]
Γ,∆ ⊢ A⊗B
Γ ⊢ A⊗B ∆, A,B ⊢ C
[⊗E]
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
Figure 2: Natural deduction (in sequent-style) rules for⊗ and⊸
Since, over ALi, [CON] entails [CWC], the Łukasiewicz systems sit in between the
affine systems, where no contraction is permitted, and the systems with full contrac-
tion. In this sense, one can think of [CWC] as extending ALi with a restricted form of
contraction that keeps track of what is left unconsumed when one uses A and A⊸ B
to obtain B.
The main result in this paper is that all four standard negative translations of CL
into IL are also negative translations of ŁLc into ŁLi (Section 5). Our result relies on
several derivations of novel theorems of ŁLi, in particular the result that, over ŁLi, the
double negation mapping A 7→ A⊥⊥ is a homomorphism (Section 4).
We also prove that Kolmogorov’s and Go¨del’s translations are even negative trans-
lations of ALc into ALi (Section 3), and in an appendix give a brief description of
counter-examples demonstrating that Glivenko and Gentzen are not: in fact ALi can
be extended so as to make the Glivenko translation a negative translation but not the
Gentzen translation or vice versa.
In the present paper, whenever we need to show that a formula is provable in one
of our logics, we do so constructively. In the case of ŁLi most non-trivial deriva-
tions involve intricate applications of [CWC]. We express here our gratitude to the late
Bill McCune for the development of the automated theorem prover Prover9 and the
finite-model finder Mace4 [16], which we have used extensively to find derivations or
counter-models to our various conjectures. Most of the ŁLi derivations presented here
were initially found by Prover9. Perhaps remarkably, we found it possible to organ-
ise and present the derivations in what we believe is a systematic and human-readable
style.
2 Definitions of the Logics
2.1 Language
We work in a language, L, built from a countable set of propositional variables Var =
{P1, P2, . . .}, the constant ⊥ (falsehood) and the binary connectives⊸ (implication)
and ⊗ (conjunction). We write A⊥ for A ⊸ ⊥ and ⊤ for ⊥ ⊸ ⊥. Our choice of
notation for connectives is that commonly used for affine logic, since all the systems
we consider will be extensions of intuitionistic affine logic.
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As usual, we adopt the convention that ⊸ associates to the right and has lower
precedence than ⊗, which in turn has lower precedence than (·)⊥. So, for example,
the brackets in (A ⊗ (B⊥)) ⊸ (C ⊸ (D ⊗ F )) are all redundant, while those in
(((A⊸ B)⊸ C)⊗D)⊥ are all required.
2.2 The logics
In this section we give natural deduction systems (in sequent style) for the logics we
will study. The judgments of the calculi are sequents Γ ⊢ A where the context Γ is
a multiset of formulas and A is a formula. The rules of inference for all the calculi
comprise the sequent formulation of a natural deduction system shown in Figure 2.
The six calculi are defined by adding to the rules of Figure 2 some or all of the
following axiom schemata: assumption [ASM], contraction [CON], ex falso quodlibet
[EFQ], double negation elimination [DNE], and commutativity of weak conjunction
[CWC], defined in Figure 3. The six calculi and their axiom schemata are as defined in
Table 1.
The systems ALi, ALc, ŁLi and ŁLc are intuitionistic and classical variants of
affine logic and Łukasiewicz logic. IL and CL as we shall see shortly are the usual
intuitionistic and classical logic. The relationship between the six logics is depicted in
Figure 1.
As our axiom schemata all allow additional premisses Γ in the context, the follow-
ing rule of weakening
Γ ⊢ B
[WK]
Γ, A ⊢ B
is admissible in all our logics, since given a proof tree with Γ ⊢ B at the root, we
may obtain a proof of Γ, A ⊢ B by adding A to the context of every sequent on some
path from the root to a leaf (axiom). Also, note that in intuitionistic affine logic ALi,
and hence in all the logics, the contraction axiom [CON] is inter-derivable with the
contraction rule
Γ, A,A ⊢ B
[CONr]
Γ, A ⊢ B
Thus with [CON] we have the structural rules of weakening and contraction, which
proves our claim that IL and CL are the usual intuitionistic and classical propositional
logics.
Many of the results in this paper involve the derivability of a particular sequent in
one of our calculi above (mainly ŁLi). When deriving these, we will make clear in the
statement of the result which logic we are using, and will present proofs as sequences
of formulas, all of which are either an assumption, an axiom, or a consequence of
previously derived formulas. We illustrate this with the following basic result:
Lemma 1 (ŁLi) If C ⊢ A and C ⊢ B then C ⊢ A⊗ (A⊸ B).
Proof:
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[ASM]
Γ, A ⊢ A
[CON]
Γ, A ⊢ A⊗A
[EFQ]
Γ,⊥ ⊢ A
[DNE]
Γ,¬¬A ⊢ A
[CWC]
Γ, A,A⊸ B ⊢ B ⊗ (B⊸ A)
Figure 3: Sequent Calculus Axioms
Calculus Axiom Schemata
ALi [ASM], [EFQ]
ALc [ASM], [EFQ], [DNE]
ŁLi [ASM], [CWC], [EFQ]
ŁLc [ASM], [CWC], [EFQ], [DNE]
IL [ASM], [CON], [EFQ]
CL [ASM], [CON], [EFQ], [DNE]
Table 1: The Six Calculi
C ⊸ A [Given] (1)
C ⊸ B [Given] (2)
C [Given] (3)
A⊗ (A⊸ C) [By (1), (3) and CWC] (4)
A⊗ (A⊸ B) [By (2) and (4)]
The above lemma shows that (over ŁLi) A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) is the weakest formulas
that is stronger than both A and B. Note that since we do not have contraction in ŁLi,
in the above proof it is important that (3) is only used once, and that its consequence
(4) is also only used once, and so on.
Notation. We will apply the [CWC] axiom in slightly different ways. For instance, in
the proof above we had derived C and C ⊸ B, and by [CWC] were able to conclude
B ⊗ (B ⊸ C). In some cases we will find it more convenient to state the two conclu-
sions B and B ⊸ C in separate lines of the proof, specially when these are then used
in different ways later on (e.g. see proof of Lemma 7).
The rules of Figure 2 and the axioms of Figure 3 are closed under substitution
of formulas for variables. Hence a substitution instance of a theorem in any of our
logics is again a theorem of that logic. When reading a result such as Lemma 1, it is
immaterial whether one views the letters A, B and C as metavariables ranging over L
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or as specific variables in Var ⊂ L.
As mentioned in the introduction, in [6] one can find an earlier proposal of viewing
Łukasiewicz logic as an extension of affine logic. In that context, a rule called (&, lc)
was added to classical affine logic in order to obtain classical Łukasiewicz logic. It is
easy to check that in the presence of weakening the premise of that rule is derivable,
which means that over affine logic the rule (&, lc) should be viewed as the axiom
schema A&B ⊢ A ⊗ (A ⊸ B). Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that
we extend ŁLi with the additive conjunction A&B, with the usual rules, as in [6].
By Lemma 1 above, and since A&B ⊢ A and A&B ⊢ B, we have that over ALi
the axiom (&, lc) follows from [CWC]. Conversely, since A&B is commutative, and
A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) ⊢ A&B, it follows that over ALi the axiom [CWC] follows from
(&, lc). Therefore, one can indeed obtain ŁLi by adjoining either of the axioms to
ALi. Our choice here is to work with [CWC], and have A&B as a derived connective,
as we will see in the next section.
Particularly in the literature on Łukasiewicz logic the systems that we have pre-
sented above in natural (in sequent style) deduction are traditionally presented as Hilbert-
style systems with modus ponens as the only rule of inference (see [12], Def. 3.1.3,
for a Hilbert-style presentation of ŁLc). It can be shown that the two presentations
are equivalent in the sense that the sequent A1, A2, . . . , An ⊢ A is derivable in one of
logics iff A1⊸ A2⊸ . . .⊸ An⊸ A is derivable in the corresponding Hilbert style
system.
2.3 Derived connectives
In additon to the primitive connectives ⊗ and⊸, we will make extensive use of the
following four derived binary connectives A ⊓ B, A ⊔ B, A ⇒ B, A ↓ B defined as
follows:
A ⊓B ≡ A⊗ (A⊸ B) (pre-conjunction)
A ⊔B ≡ (B⊸ A)⊸ A (pre-disjunction)
A⇒ B ≡ A⊸ A⊗B (strong implication)
A ↓ B ≡ A⊥ ⊗ (B ⊸ A) (NOR binary connective)
Recall that we are assuming conjunction binds more strongly than the implication,
so that A ⇒ B is A ⊸ (A ⊗ B). For the new connectives we will also use the
convention that ⊓,⊔ and ↓ all bind more strongly than⇒. So (A ⊔ B) ⇒ (C ⊓D),
for instance, may be written as A ⊔B ⇒ C ⊓D.
ALi cannot prove the commutativity of ⊓ and ⊔. ŁLi adds the commutativity of
⊓ to ALi as an axiom schema, but still can’t prove the commutativity of ⊔. In ŁLi,
the pre-conjunctionA ⊓B behaves like the additive conjunctionA&B of linear logic.
ŁLc has been defined above as ŁLi extended with [DNE], but it can be shown that one
also obtains ŁLc from ŁLi by adding the commutativity of ⊔ as an axiom schema. In
ŁLc, the pre-disjunction A ⊔ B then behaves like the additive disjunction A ⊕ B of
linear logic. In IL, when full contraction is available, the two conjunctionsA ⊓B and
A ⊗ B become equivalent. However, ⊥ ⊔ A ≡ A⊥⊥ while A ⊔ ⊥ ≡ A, so that the
commutativity of ⊔ is intuitionistically unacceptable as it implies [DNE].
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We have chosen our notation so that in each of the derived connectives the left
operand appears both positively and negatively while the right operand appears only
positively in ⊓,⊔ and⇒ and only negatively in ↓.
Definition 1 Let T be any of the extensions of ALi discussed above. We write A ↔T
B if A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A in T . When the T in question is clear from the context we just
write A ↔ B.
Let A[B] be a formula that contains B as a subformula. It is easy to show, by
induction on A, that if B ↔ C then A[B] ↔ A[C].
We conclude this section with a short list of basic theorems ofALi which will prove
very useful in the sequel.
Lemma 2 (ALi) The following have simple and short derivations:
(i) A ⊢ B ⊔ A, in particular, taking B =⊥, A ⊢ A⊥⊥
(ii) A ⊢ B ⇒ A
(iii) A⊗ B ↔ A⊗ (A⇒ B)
(iv) C ⊔ (A⊸ B) ⊢ (C ⊔ A)⊸ (C ⊔B)
(v) (A⊥ ⊸ B⊥)⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥⊸ B⊥
(vi) A⊥⊥ ⊸ B⊥⊥ ↔ A⊸ B⊥⊥
(vii) (A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥⊥)⊥ ↔ (A⊗B)⊥
(viii) (A⊗B)⊥⊥ ↔ (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥)⊥
Proof: Easy, making much use of A⊥⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥ and A ⊸ B⊥ ↔ (A ⊗
B)⊥ ↔ B⊸ A⊥. For instance, we can prove (vi) via the following chain of simple
equivalences:
A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥ ↔ (A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥)⊥ ↔ (B⊥ ⊗A⊥⊥)⊥ ↔ B⊥⊸ A⊥⊥⊥
↔ B⊥⊸ A⊥ ↔ (B⊥ ⊗A)⊥ ↔ (A⊗B⊥)⊥ ↔ A⊸ B⊥⊥
3 Negative Translations
In [18], Troelstra identifies certain requirements on a translation of classical logic into
intuitionistic logic and shows that any two translations satisfying these requirements
are intuitionistically equivalent. To set up the analogue of this characterisation in our
substructural setting, we first define the notion of negative formula in the language L.
Definition 2 The set N of negative formulas is defined inductively as
• ⊥ ∈ N ,
• if A ∈ N and B ∈ N then A⊗ B ∈ N ,
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• if B ∈ N then A⊸ B ∈ N .
We can now formulate an adaptation of Troelstra’s requirements:
Definition 3 Let L be a fragment of intuitionistic logic IL over the language L. A
formula translation (·)† : L → L is called a negative translation for L if the following
holds for every formula A in the language of L
(NT1) L proves A† ⊢ B and B ⊢ A†, for some B ∈ N .
(NT2) L+ [DNE] proves A† ⊢ A and A ⊢ A†.
(NT3) if L+ [DNE] proves ⊢ A then L proves ⊢ A†.
Conditions (NT1), (NT2) and (NT3) correspond to Troelstra’s [18, Section 10]
(iii), (i) and (ii), respectively. We have rearranged them as we will show that in ŁLi
condition (NT3) is redundant (Theorem 23). It is often the case in practice that A† ∈
N , so that (NT1) holds trivially.
In this section we shall consider the four well-known negative translations for IL,
namely, Kolmogorov, Go¨del, Gentzen and Glivenko, in the context of affine logic ALi
(cf. [7] for an analysis of the relationship between these translations in the setting of
intuitionistic first-order logic). We prove that both Kolmogorov and Go¨del are negative
translation for ALi, and give counter-examples to show that Gentzen and Glivenko fail
to satisfy (NT3). In Section 5, however, we will see that in ŁLi all these formula trans-
lations are negative translations, and in fact, we will also be able to show all negative
translations are provably equivalent in ŁLi.
3.1 Kolmogorov and Go¨del translations
First of all, we show that both the Kolmogorov and the Go¨del translations are in fact
negative translations for affine logic, i.e. no contraction is necessary to prove (NT1) –
(NT3). Let L be the language of the theories ALc and ALi.
Definition 4 (Kolmogorov translation [14]) For each formulaA ∈ L associate a for-
mula AK ∈ L inductively as follows:
PK ≡ P⊥⊥ (P atomic)
⊥K ≡ ⊥
(A⊗B)K ≡ (AK ⊗BK)⊥⊥
(A⊸ B)
K ≡ (AK ⊸ BK)⊥⊥.
We will also consider the following negative translation which can be distilled from
[11]. In Go¨del’s presentation an implication A⊸ B is translated as (A ⊗ B⊥)⊥. We
use here that in ALi this is equivalent to A ⊸ B
⊥⊥. The translation often referred
to as the Go¨del-Gentzen translation will be treated in the following section, where we
attribute it to Gentzen. It will become clear that in the substructural setting the Go¨del
translation is not the same as the Gentzen one.
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Definition 5 (Go¨del translation [11]) For each formula A ∈ L we first associate a
formula A∗ ∈ L inductively as follows:
P ∗ ≡ P (P atomic)
⊥∗ ≡ ⊥
(A⊗B)∗ ≡ A∗ ⊗B∗
(A⊸ B)
∗ ≡ A∗⊸ (B∗)⊥⊥.
Then we define AGo¨ = (A∗)⊥⊥. Go¨del [11] in fact does not need this final double
negation since in Heyting arithmetic one can already prove (A∗)⊥⊥ ⊢ A∗. Hence in
that context we can even take AGo¨ = A∗. In ALi, however, we need the outermost
double negation to make the proof of the following theorem go through.
Theorem 3 Both the Kolmogorov translation (·)K and the Go¨del translation (·)Go¨ are
negative translations for ALi.
Proof: In the case of Kolmogov we have:
(NT1). Trivial since AK ∈ N .
(NT2). Clearly ALc = ALi + [DNE] provesA ↔ A
K.
(NT3). Finally, we show that if Γ ⊢ A is provable in ALc then Γ
K ⊢ AK is provable
in ALi, where Γ
K abbreviates B0
K, . . . Bn
K. This can be shown by induction on the
derivation of the sequent Γ ⊢ A. The cases of the axioms [ASM] and [EFQ] are trivial.
In the case of [DNE] we just need to observe that A⊥⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥ holds in ALi (cf.
Lemma 2). In the case of [⊸E] we need to derive ΓK,∆K ⊢ BK from ΓK ⊢ AK and
∆K ⊢ (A⊸ B)K. This can be done as
ΓK ⊢ AK
∆K ⊢ (A⊸ B)K
(def)
∆K ⊢ (AK⊸ BK)⊥⊥
(Lemma 2 (v))
∆K ⊢ AK ⊸ BK
[⊸E]
ΓK,∆K ⊢ BK
[⊸I] can also be easily shown as
ΓK, AK ⊢ BK
[⊸I]
ΓK ⊢ AK⊸ BK
(Lemma 2 (v))
ΓK ⊢ (AK ⊸ BK)⊥⊥
(def)
ΓK ⊢ (A⊸ B)K
The case of [⊗I] is easy once we observe thatA ⊢ A⊥⊥ is provable in ALi (cf. Lemma
2).
9
Finally, the case of [⊗E] can be shown as
ΓK ⊢ (A⊗B)K
(def)
ΓK ⊢ (AK ⊗BK)⊥⊥
∆K, AK, BK ⊢ CK
====================
∆K, (CK)⊥ ⊢ (AK ⊗BK)⊥
[⊸E]
ΓK,∆K, (CK)⊥ ⊢ ⊥
[⊸I]
ΓK,∆K ⊢ (CK)⊥⊥
ΓK,∆K ⊢ CK
In the final step above we are using that (AK)⊥⊥ ↔ AK, which is easy to show.
For the Go¨del translation, it is enough to show that AK ↔ AGo¨ in ALi. We do that by
induction on the structure of A. The base case is trivial. Recall that AGo¨ = (A∗)⊥⊥.
For implication we have
(A⊸ B)
K ↔ (AK ⊸ BK)⊥⊥ (def (·)K)
↔ ((A∗)⊥⊥⊸ (B∗)⊥⊥)⊥⊥ (IH)
↔ (A∗ ⊸ (B∗)⊥⊥)⊥⊥ (Lemma 2 (vi))
↔ (A⊸ B)Go¨. (def (·)Go¨)
Similarly for conjunction
(A⊗B)K ↔ (AK ⊗BK)⊥⊥ (def (·)K)
↔ ((A∗)⊥⊥ ⊗ (B∗)⊥⊥)⊥⊥ (IH)
↔ (A∗ ⊗B∗)⊥⊥ (Lemma 2 (vii))
↔ (A⊗B)Go¨. (def (·)Go¨)
That concludes the inductive proof.
3.2 Gentzen and Glivenko translations
For both the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations (defined below) a corresponding
Theorem 3 no longer holds for ALi. These translations rely on uses of contraction
which are not available in affine logic. Nevertheless, we will find that the amount of
contraction available in Łukasiewicz logic, via [CWC], is sufficient for these transla-
tions to go through (Section 5). The Gentzen negative translation works by adding
double negations on all the atoms of a given formula:
Definition 6 (Gentzen translation [8]) For each formula A ∈ L associate a formula
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AGen ∈ L inductively as follows:
PGen ≡ P⊥⊥ (P atomic)
⊥Gen ≡ ⊥
(A⊗B)Gen ≡ AGen ⊗ BGen
(A⊸ B)
Gen ≡ AGen ⊸ BGen.
As A⊥ = A⊸ ⊥, we have that (A⊥)
Gen
is equivalent to (AGen)⊥.
Theorem 4 The translation (·)Gen is not a negative translation for ALi.
Proof: We show that (NT3) fails for the Gentzen translation on ALi. Let P,Q be
atomic formulas and take A ≡ (P ⊗ Q)⊥⊥ ⊸ (P ⊗ Q). Obviously ALc proves A,
since A is an instance of [DNE]. However the Gentzen translation of A is
(P⊥⊥ ⊗Q⊥⊥)⊥⊥⊸ P⊥⊥ ⊗Q⊥⊥
which is not provable inALi (see Lemma 25 part (i) in AppendixA for a model demon-
strating this).
The Glivenko negative translation simply doubly negates the whole formula:
Definition 7 (Glivenko translation [10]) Given a formula A ∈ L define its Glivenko
translation AGli as AGli ≡ A⊥⊥.
Theorem 5 The Glivenko translation is not a negative translation for ALi.
Proof: As with the Go¨del translation, we also show that (NT3) fails in the Glivenko
translation for ALi. Let P be an atomic formula. The Glivenko translation of P
⊥⊥
⊸
P (an instance of [DNE]) is (P⊥⊥ ⊸ P )⊥⊥, which is not provable in ALi (see
Lemma 25 part (ii) in Appendix A for a model demonstrating this).
We conclude by noting that the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations do not have
to fail simultaneously, i.e. there are extensions of ALi for which one translation works
but the other does not.
Theorem 6 There are extensionsA1 andA2 of ALi such that
(i) (·)Gli is a negative translation forA1 but (·)
Gen
is not;
(ii) (·)Gen is a negative translation forA2 but (·)
Gli
is not.
Proof: See Theorem 26 in Appendix A.
Remark 1 ALi can be presented using a Gentzen-style sequent calculus that admits
cut-elimination. This leads to a relatively efficient decision procedure for ALi which
one can use as an alternative to semantic methods to decide unprovability where
needed in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5. However, we do not know of a proof
based on cut-elimination for Theorem 6.
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4 HomomorphismProperties of Double Negation in ŁLi
Our goal in this section is to find ŁLi derivations of some important theorems about
the primitive and derived connectives. These include:
• a derivation of [DNE]⊥⊥ (Corollary 13);
• a duality property between ⊔ and ↓ (Theorem 14); and,
• homomorphism properties of the double negation mapping A 7→ A⊥⊥ with re-
spect to both implication (Section 4.3) and conjunction (Section 4.4);
As we have already remarked, the derivations we will give have been extracted
by analysis of computer-generated proofs found by the Prover9 automated theorem-
prover. Our contribution was to propose conjectures to Prover9, to study the machine-
oriented proofs it found and to present the proofs in a human-intelligible form by break-
ing them down into structurally interesting lemmas. This was an iterative process since
often Prover9 was able to find simpler proofs of a lemma when presented with it as a
conjecture in isolation. In cases when Prover9 was unable to find a proof, Mace4 was
often able to find a counter-model: a finite model of the logic in question in which the
conjecture can be seen to fail. See Appendix A for examples of algebraic models of
ALi found by Mace4.
It follows from work on commutative GBL-algebras that ŁLi is decidable [5].
However the problem is PSPACE-complete. In [2], we give a simple indirect method
for demonstrating that a formula is valid in intuitionistic Łukasiewicz Logic, a heuristic
method which we have used extensively in parallel with attempts to find explicit proofs
and counter-examples with Prover9 and Mace4.
4.1 Basic identities on ⊔,⇒,⊓
We start by proving in ŁLi several useful results about the derived connectives ⊔,⊓
and⇒.
Lemma 7 (ŁLi) B ⊔ (A⇒ B) ⊢ A⇒ B
Proof: Since A⇒ B ≡ A⊸ A⊗B, we will show A,B ⊔ (A⇒ B) ⊢ A⊗B:
A [Given] (5)
B ⊔ (A⇒ B) (i.e., ((A⇒ B)⊸ B)⊸ B) [Given] (6)
A⊸ ((A⇒ B)⊸ B) [Derivable] (7)
(A⇒ B)⊸ B [By (5), (7) and CWC] (8)
((A⇒ B)⊸ B)⊸ A (9)
B [By (6), (8) and⊸E] (10)
B⊸ (A⇒ B) [By Lemma 2 (ii)] (11)
A⇒ B (i.e., A⊸ A⊗B) [By (10), (11) and CWC] (12)
(A⇒ B)⊸ B (13)
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A [By (9), (13) and⊸E] (14)
A⊗B [By (12), (14) and⊸E]
The following lemma is used in Section 4.4. It shows that from A ⊸ C and
C ⊸ B we can conclude more than A⊸ C.
Lemma 8 (ŁLi) A⊸ C,C ⊸ B ⊢ (A⊸ B)⊗ (A ⊓B⊸ C)
Proof:
A⊸ C [Given] (15)
C ⊸ B [Given] (16)
(A⊸ C)⊸ (A⊸ B) [From (16), easy] (17)
(A⊸ B)⊗ ((A⊸ B)⊸ (A⊸ C)) [By (15) and (17) and CWC] (18)
(A⊸ B)⊗ (A ⊓B⊸ C) [By (18) and Def. of A ⊓B]
So far, we have not used the constant ⊥. We now prove a few basic properties of
(·)⊥ and its relation to the derived connectives.
Lemma 9 (ŁLi) B ⊔ A ⊢ A
⊥ ⇒ B
Proof:
B ⊔ A [Given] (19)
A⊸ (A⊥ ⇒ B) [Derivable, easy] (20)
B ⊔ (A⊥ ⇒ B) [By (19) and (20)] (21)
A⊥ ⇒ B [By (21) and Lemma 7]
It turns out that many intuitionistically unacceptable equivalences become provable
in ŁLi “under” a negation. For example, our first important result is that in ŁLi strong
implication⇒ is a dual of a weak conjunction ⊓ in the sense that (A ⊓B)⊥ ↔ A⇒
B⊥. This is akin to the relation between conjunction and implication (A ⊗ B)⊥ ↔
A⊸ B⊥ which one obtains in ALi simply by currying and uncurrying.
Theorem 10 (ŁLi) (A ⊓B)
⊥ ↔ A⇒ B⊥
Proof: The derivation of A ⇒ B⊥ ⊢ (A ⊓ B)⊥ is straightforward. We present the
derivation of the converse (A ⊓B)⊥ ⊢ A⇒ B⊥,
(A ⊓B)⊥ (i.e., (A⊗ (A⊸ B))⊥) [Given] (22)
A⊸ (B⊸ A) [Derivable, easy] (23)
B⊥⊸ (A ⊔B)⊸ A⊗B⊥ [Derivable, Lemma 9] (24)
(B ⊗ (B⊸ A))⊥ [From (22) and CWC] (25)
(B⊸ A)⊸ B⊥ [From (25), easy] (26)
(B⊸ A)⊸ (A ⊔B)⊸ A⊗B⊥ [By (24) and (26)] (27)
A⊸ (A⊸ (B ⊸ A))⊸ A⊗B⊥ [By (27) and CWC] (28)
A⊸ A⊗B⊥ [By (23) and (28)] (29)
A⇒ B⊥ [By (29) and Def. of A⇒ B]
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Corollary 11 (ŁLi) A⇒ B
⊥ ↔ B ⇒ A⊥
Proof: Direct from Theorem 10, since ⊓ is commutative (i.e. [CWC]).
4.2 Symmetries of ⊔ and ↓ and [DNE]
Although the commutativity of ⊔ is clearly a classical principle, it is perhaps surprising
that commutativity of B ↓ A can be proved intuitionistically.
Theorem 12 (ŁLi) B ↓ A ↔ A ↓ B
Proof: By symmetry it is enough to prove B ↓ A ⊢ A ↓ B. Recall that B ↓ A is
defined as (B ⊸ A) ⊗ A⊥. Hence, we must show B ⊸ A,A⊥ ⊢ (A ⊸ B) ⊗ B⊥,
which we can do as follows:
B⊸ A [Given] (30)
A⊥ [Given] (31)
A⊥ ⊸ (A⊸ B) [Derivable (using [EFQ])] (32)
A⊸ B [From (31), (32) and CWC] (33)
(A⊸ B)⊸ A⊥ (34)
(B ⊸ A)⊸ B⊥ [From (34) and CWC] (35)
B⊥ [By (30) and (35)] (36)
(A⊸ B)⊗B⊥ [By (33) and (36)]
A corollary of the above theorem is that the double negation of the classical axiom
[DNE] is provable in ŁLi.
Corollary 13 (ŁLi) (A
⊥⊥
⊸ A)⊥⊥
Proof: LetX = (A⊥ ⇒ A). Then
(A⊥⊥⊸ A)⊥ [Given] (37)
A⊥⊥⊸ (A⊥ ⇒ A) [Derivable, easy] (38)
((A⊥ ⇒ A)⊸ A)⊥ [From (37) using (38)] (39)
A⊸ ((A⊥ ⇒ A)⊸ A) [Derivable (using [WK])] (40)
((A⊥ ⇒ A)⊸ A) ↓ A [From (39) and (43)] (41)
A ↓ ((A⊥ ⇒ A)⊸ A) [By (41) and Theorem 12] (42)
(A ↓ (X ⊸ A))⊸ (A⊥ ⊗ (A ⊔X)) [Derivable, easy] (43)
A⊥ ⊗ (A ⊔ (A⊥ ⇒ A)) [By (42) and (43)] (44)
A⊥ ⊗A [By (44) and Lemma (7)] (45)
⊥ [Easy]
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Remark 2 It is well known that the above corollary is provable in full intuitionistic
logic IL. The usual proof making (apparently) essential use of the full contraction
axiom goes as follows. Assuming (a) (A⊥⊥ ⊸ A)⊥ we must derive a contradiction.
First use (a) to derive A⊥, by [WK]. Assume also (b) A⊥⊥. From (b) and A⊥ we
obtain ⊥, and hence A. Discharging the assumption (b) we have A⊥⊥ ⊸ A, which
by (a) gives a contradiction. Note, however, that assumption (a) was used twice. The
corollary above gives us a proof using only the weak form of contraction permitted by
[CWC].
Next we present a theorem showing that the NOR connective A ↓ B is indeed
the negation of the disjunction ⊔, a fact which holds in full intuitionistic logic IL,
but again, via a simple proof that appears to make essential use of the full contraction
axiom.
Theorem 14 (ŁLi) (A ⊔B)
⊥ ↔ A ↓ B
Proof: As usual one of the directions is easy, in this case A ↓ B ⊢ (A ⊔ B)⊥. We
prove the other direction ((B⊸ A)⊸ A)⊥ ⊢ A⊥ ⊗ (B⊸ A) as follows:
((B⊸ A)⊸ A)⊥ [Given] (46)
((B⊸ A)⊸ A)⊥⊸ (B⊸ A) [Derivable] (47)
B⊸ A [From (46) and (47) and CWC] (48)
(B⊸ A)⊸ ((B ⊸ A)⊸ A)⊥ (49)
((B⊸ A)⊗ ((B⊸ A)⊸ A))⊥ [By (49), easy] (50)
(A⊗ (A⊸ (B ⊸ A)))⊥ [By (50) and CWC] (51)
A⊸ (B ⊸ A) [Derivable] (52)
A⊥ [By (51) and (52)] (53)
A⊥ ⊗ (B ⊸ A) [By (48) and (53) ]
The above theorem implies the commutativity of A ⊔B under a negation:
Theorem 15 (ŁLi) (A ⊔B)
⊥ ↔ (B ⊔ A)⊥
Proof: Direct from Theorems 12 and 14.
4.3 Double negation homomorphism: Implication
We now show that (in ŁLi) the double negation mapping A 7→ A
⊥⊥ is a homomor-
phism for implication, i.e.
(A⊸ B)⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥.
We will show the same for conjunction in Section 4.4. Note that by definition⊥ ⊔A ≡
A⊥⊥. Hence, it follows from Lemma 2 (iv) that
(A⊸ B)⊥⊥ ⊢ A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥
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and hence (A ⊸ B)⊥⊥ ⊢ A ⊸ B⊥⊥ is provable already in ALi. We will now
see that the converse implication holds in ŁLi. Again, the fact that this holds in full
intuitionistic logic is well known. See [18], page 9, for instance, for an IL-derivation
of Theorem 16. That derivation, however, uses the assumption (A⊸ B)⊥ twice, and
hence cannot be formalised in ŁLi.
Theorem 16 (ŁLi) A
⊥⊥
⊸ B⊥⊥ ↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥
Proof: By the remarks above, we have only the left-to-right direction to prove:
A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥ [Given] (54)
A⊸ A⊥⊥ [Derivable] (55)
A⊸ B⊥⊥ [From (54) and (55)] (56)
(B⊥⊥⊸ B)⊸ (A⊸ B) [From (56)] (57)
(A⊸ B)⊥⊸ (B⊥⊥⊸ B)⊥ [From (57)] (58)
(A⊸ B)⊥⊸ ⊥ [From (58) and Corollary 13] (59)
(A⊸ B)⊥⊥ [By (59)]
4.4 Double negation homomorphism: Conjunction
As done in Section 4.3 for implication, we now show that (in ŁLi) the double negation
mappingA 7→ A⊥⊥ is also a homomorphism for conjunction, i.e.
(A⊗B)⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥⊥.
This result will follow immediately from a duality between implication (⊸) and con-
junction (⊗) – Theorem 18 below.
Lemma 17 (ŁLi) A
⊥ ↔ (A⊸ B)⊗ (A ⊓B)⊥
Proof: Left-to-right follows directly from Lemma 8, taking C = ⊥. For the converse
observe that (A ⊓B)⊥ ↔ A⊸ (A⊸ B)⊥.
Theorem 18 (ŁLi) (A
⊥
⊸ B)⊥ ↔ A⊥ ⊗B⊥
Proof: The implication from right to left is easy. For the other direction:
(A⊥⊸ B)⊥ [Given] (60)
(A⊥⊥ ⇒ (A⊥ ⊸ B)⊥)⊸ A⊥ [Derivable] (61)
(A⊥⊸ B)⊸ A⊥⊥ [By (60) and Lemma (17)] (62)
((A⊥ ⊸ B) ⊓ A⊥⊥)⊥ (63)
(A⊥ ⊓B)⊥ [By (62), easy] (64)
A⊥ ⇒ B⊥ [By (64) and Theorem 10] (65)
A⊥⊥ ⇒ (A⊥ ⊸ B)⊥ [By (63) and Theorem 10] (66)
A⊥ [By (61) and (66)] (67)
A⊥ ⊗B⊥ [By (65) and (67)]
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Theorem 19 (ŁLi) (A⊗B)
⊥⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥⊥
Proof: By Theorem 18, (A⊥⊥ ⊸ B⊥)⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗ B⊥⊥. But it is easy to show
that (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥)⊥ ↔ (A⊗B)⊥⊥, even in ALi (cf. Lemma 2).
4.5 Some De Morgan Dualities for ŁLi
Theorem 10 proves an interesting De Morgan duality between ⊓ and ⇒. For com-
pleteness, we now give analogous dualities for all of our connectives (primitive and
derived).
Theorem 20 The following De Morgan dualities hold in ŁLi
(A⊗B)⊥ ↔ A⊸ B⊥
(A⊸ B)⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥
(A ⊓B)⊥ ↔ A⇒ B⊥
(A⇒ B)⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥ ⊓B⊥
(A ⊓B)⊥ ↔ A⊥ ⊔B⊥
(A ⊔B)⊥ ↔ A⊥ ⊓B⊥
(A ↓ B)⊥ ↔ A⊥ ⇒ B⊥⊥
Proof: The first equation (A⊗B)⊥ ↔ A⊸ B⊥ follows directly from currying and
uncurrying. For the second equation we calculate as follows
(A⊸ B)⊥ ↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥⊥ (easy)
↔ (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥)⊥ (Theorem 16)
↔ (B⊥ ⊸ A⊥)⊥ (easy)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥. (Theorem 18)
The third equation follows from Theorem 10 and [CWC]. The fourth equation can be
derived as:
(A⇒ B)⊥ ↔ (A⊸ A⊗B)⊥ (def⇒)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗ (A⊗B)⊥ (duality of⊸)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗ (B ⊸ A⊥) (duality of ⊗)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗ (B ⊸ A⊥⊥⊥) (A⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥⊥)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊗ (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥) (easy)
↔ A⊥⊥ ⊓B⊥. (def ⊓)
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The fifth equation follows by:
(A ⊓B)⊥ ↔ (A⊗ (A⊸ B))⊥ (easy)
↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥⊸ A⊥ (easy)
↔ (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥)⊸ A⊥ (Theorems 16)
↔ (B⊥⊸ A⊥)⊸ A⊥ (easy)
↔ A⊥ ⊔B⊥.
For the sixth equation we proceed as follows:
(B ⊔A)⊥ ↔ ((A⊸ B)⊸ B)⊥ (def ⊔)
↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥ (duality of⊸)
↔ (A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥)⊥ ⊗B⊥ (duality of⊸)
↔ (B⊥ ⊸ A⊥⊥⊥)⊗B⊥ (duality of ⊗)
↔ (B⊥ ⊸ A⊥)⊗B⊥ (A⊥ ↔ A⊥⊥⊥)
↔ B⊥ ⊓ A⊥. (def ⊓)
The last equation follows from Theorem 14 and the laws for ⊓ and ⊔.
5 Negative Translations of Łukasiewicz Logic
In this section we show that all four translations considered (Kolmogorov, Go¨del,
Gentzen and Glivenko) are negative translations for ŁLi. In fact, as it is the case in
IL, it turns out that any two negative translations for ŁLi are equivalent. This is a
non-trivial result, since, as we have shown, the Gentzen and Glivenko translations fail
for ALi. The crucial property we will need here is that the double negation mapping
A 7→ A⊥⊥ is a homomorphism in ŁLi, as proven in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Theorem 21 The Glivenko translation (·)Gli is a negative translation for ŁLi.
Proof: We show by induction on the structure of A that AK ↔ A⊥⊥ in ŁLi. This
is similar to the proof of Theorem 3, where we showed that Go¨del’s translation is
equivalent to Kolmogorov’s in ALi. In here we need a slightly stronger version of
Lemma 2 (vi) which in fact follows from Theorem 16. Again, the base case is trivial.
For implication we have
(A⊸ B)K ↔ (AK ⊸ BK)⊥⊥ (def (·)K)
↔ (A⊥⊥⊸ B⊥⊥)⊥⊥ (IH)
↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥⊥⊥ (Theorem 16)
↔ (A⊸ B)⊥⊥. (easy)
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Similarly for conjunction
(A⊗B)K ↔ (AK ⊗BK)⊥⊥ (def (·)K)
↔ (A⊥⊥ ⊗B⊥⊥)⊥⊥ (IH)
↔ (A⊗ B)⊥⊥⊥⊥ (Lemma 2 (vi))
↔ (A⊗ B)⊥⊥. (easy)
But note that we have not yet used the full strength of our homomorphism proper-
ties for double negation, as we only used it in a “negated context”. We will make use
of them now to show that any translation for ŁLi which satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) will
in fact also satisfy (NT3).
Lemma 22 For any formula A ∈ N we have that A ↔ŁLi
A⊥⊥.
Proof: By induction on A ∈ N . We need to consider three cases:
If A = ⊥ the result is trivial.
If A = B ⊸ C with C ∈ N then, by the inductive hypothesis, C ↔ C⊥⊥. Hence
B ⊸ C ↔ B ⊸ C⊥⊥. Since B ⊸ C⊥⊥ ↔ B⊥⊥ ⊸ C⊥⊥, even in ALi, by
Theorem 16 we have that B ⊸ C ↔ (B⊸ C)⊥⊥.
If A = B ⊗ C with B,C ∈ N then, by the inductive hypothesis, we have that B ↔
B⊥⊥ and B ↔ B⊥⊥, hence B ⊗ C ↔ (B ⊗ C)⊥⊥ by Theorem 19.
Theorem 23 Any translation (·)† for ŁLi which satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) is equiva-
lent to (·)Gli and hence is a negative translation, i.e., (·)† also satisfies (NT3).
Proof: Fix a formula A. By (NT1), A† ↔ B with B ∈ N . That A† ↔ŁLi
AGli
can be shown as
A† ↔ B
↔ B⊥⊥ (Lemma 22)
↔ (A†)⊥⊥ (since A† ↔ B)
↔ A⊥⊥. (by (NT2) and Theorem 21)
By Theorem 21, (·)Gli satisfies (NT3), hence so does (·)†.
Corollary 24 The Gentzen translation (·)Gen is a negative translation for ŁLi.
Proof: Since (·)Gen satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) in ŁLi.
Theorem 23 can be used to conclude that several other formula translations are also
negative translations for ŁLi.
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Example 1 Define a variant of the Go¨del translation whereby the definition of (A⊸ B)
∗
is modified as
(A⊸ B)∗ ≡ A⊸ (B∗)⊥⊥,
i.e. the premise of the implication is not inductively translated. It is easy to see that
this “simplification” still satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) and hence, by Theorem 23, is a
negative translation forŁLi. A similar simplification can be considered for the Gentzen
translation, leading, again, to a negative translation for ŁLi.
Example 2 Define A† ∈ L inductively as follows:
P † ≡ P⊥ (P atomic)
⊥† ≡ ⊤
(A⊗B)† ≡ A†⊸ (B†)⊥
(A⊸ B)
† ≡ A† ⊗ (B†)⊥.
Then we define the Krivine translation of A as AKr = (A†)⊥. The formula AKr is
clearly a negative formula. It is also easy to check that AKr ↔ŁLc
A. Therefore,
by Theorem 23, it is a negative translation for ŁLi. This translation is inspired by the
negative translation behind Krivine’s classical realizability interpretation [15, 17].
6 Concluding Remarks
Let us conclude with an argument that supports our choice of the name “intuitionis-
tic Łukasiewicz logic” for the logic ŁLi. First, an “intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic”
should be both a fragment of Łukasiewicz logic ŁLc and intuitionistic logic IL; and
ŁLi satisfies this criteria. But there are indeed other ”logics” which also satisfy this
criteria, so why to single out ŁLi?
First, one might try to simply take the intersection of IL and ŁLc. This is indeed
the maximal set of logical theorems which are both valid in ŁLc and IL. But it is not
clear to us how one could give a simple sequent calculus for such logic. Moreover,
this logic would not have the disjunction property, since [DNE] ∨ [CON] belongs to
the intersection, but [DNE] is not provable in IL, and [CON] is not provable in ŁLc.
Indeed, this has gone beyond what a constructivist would accept as an “intuitionistic”
fragment of ŁLc.
Given our results above about the soundness of the negative translations for ŁLc
and ŁLi, we want to argue that ŁLi is the only logic to be an extension of ALi having
this soundness property. More precisely, let ∆ be some axiom schema such that
(1) ALi +∆ ⊂ IL, i.e. ∆ is intuitionistically valid,
(2) ALi +∆+ [DNE] = ŁLc, i.e. ∆ and [DNE] together takes ALi to ŁLc
and suppose the Glivenko translation is a negative translation for ALi +∆, i.e.
(3) if ŁLc proves ⊢ A then ALi +∆ proves ⊢ A
⊥⊥.
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We argue that overALi we have∆
⊥⊥ ↔ [CWC]⊥⊥, in the sense that for any instance
B of [CWC] there exists A1, . . . , An ∈ ∆ such that ALi proves A1
⊥⊥, . . . , An
⊥⊥ ⊢
B⊥⊥; and similarly with [CWC] and∆ interchanged.
First, assume B ∈ [CWC]. Since ŁLc proves ⊢ B, by (3) we have that ALi + ∆
proves ⊢ B⊥⊥. Which means that for some A1, . . . , An ∈ ∆ we have that ALi proves
A1
⊥⊥, . . . , An
⊥⊥ ⊢ B⊥⊥, using Lemma 2 (vi).
Conversely, assume B ∈ ∆. Again, since ŁLc proves ⊢ B, by our soundness
result for the Glivenko translation (Theorem 21), we have that ALi + [CWC] proves
⊢ B⊥⊥. Which means that for some A1, . . . , An ∈ [CWC] we have that ALi proves
A1
⊥⊥, . . . , An
⊥⊥ ⊢ B⊥⊥, again using Lemma 2 (vi).
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A Semantics: pocrims and hoops
In this appendix: we give a brief sketch of the algebraic semantics for ALi and exten-
sions thereof; we exhibit the models mentioned in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5; and
we exhibit extensions of ALi to justify Theorem 6. Most of these models were found
with the assistance of Mace4 [16].
Definition 8 A (bounded) pocrim is a structure P for the signature (1, 0, ·,→;≤) of
type (0, 0, 2, 2; 2), such that, (i) the (1, ·,≤)-reduct of P is an ordered commutative
monoid (written multiplicatively) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 for every x, (ii) for every x and y,
x ≤ y iff x → y = 1, and (iii) the residuation property holds: for every x, y and z,
x · y ≤ z iff x ≤ y → z.
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A hoop is a pocrim in which x · (x→ y) = y · (y → x) holds for every x, y and z.
In any pocrim, we define the negation operator ¬, by ¬x = x→ 0, and the double
negation operator, δ, by δ(x) = ¬¬x. A pocrim is involutive if δ(x) = x for every x.
The name “pocrim” is an acronym for “partially ordered, commutative, residuated,
integral monoid”. All the pocrims in this appendix will be finite, and hence necessarily
bounded, i.e., they have a least element 0, so we will often omit “bounded”.
We define the notions of satisfaction, validity, soundness and completeness in the
usual way. That is to say, given a pocrim P = (P, 1, 0, ·,→;≤) and an interpretation
I : Var → P , we define the value VI(A) of a formula A under I by VI(Pi) = I(Pi),
VI(A⊗B) = VI(A) · VI(B) and VI(A⊸ B) = VI(A)→ VI(B). We say I satisfies
A and write I |= A if VI(A) = 1 and we say P satisfies A and write P |= A if I |= A
for every interpretation of I in P. If C is a class of pocrims, we say A is valid in C and
write C |= A if P |= A for every pocrim P ∈ C. We say A is sound for a class C of
pocrims, if whenever A is provable in A then C |= A; we say A is complete for C if
whenever C |= A then A is provable in A.
It can be shown using well-known methods that ALi is sound and complete for the
class P of all bounded pocrims and that ŁLi is sound and complete for the class H of
all hoops.
Note that idempotency (x = x ·x for all x ∈ P ) in pocrims corresponds to contrac-
tion in logic. The smallest pocrim that is not idempotent has three elements 0, a and 1,
where a is not idempotent so that we must have a · a = 0. We call this pocrim L3. The
ordering is 1 > a > 0 and the operation tables are as follows:
· 1 a 0
1 1 a 0
a a 0 0
0 0 0 0
→ 1 a 0
1 1 a 0
a 1 1 a
0 1 1 1
δ
1 1
a a
0 0
Here we list the elements in decreasing order so that the identity for multiplication
goes in its familiar place in column 1 and row 1. We tabulate double negation as well
as multiplication and implication for convenience in later calculations.
Noting that the hoop identity x · (x → y) = y · (y → x) holds in any pocrim if
x ∈ {0, 1} or if x = y, one sees that L3 is a hoop. The tabulated value of δ shows that
L3 is also involutive. It can be shown that (up to isomorphism) there are 7 pocrims of
order 4 of which 2, which we call P4 and Q4, are not hoops. P4 comprises the chain
1 > b > c > 0. The operation tables forP4 are as follows.
· 1 b c 0
1 1 b c 0
b b 0 0 0
c c 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
→ 1 b c 0
1 1 b c 0
b 1 1 b b
c 1 1 1 b
0 1 1 1 1
δ
1 1
b b
c b
0 0
In P4, δ(c) = b, so P4 is not involutive. Moreover P4 is not a hoop since b · (b →
c) = 0 6= c = c · (c→ b). However, the image of double negation is a subpocrim with
universe {0, b, 1} isomorphic to the involutive hoop L3.
Q4 comprises the chain 1 > p > q > 0 and has operation tables as follows:
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· 1 p q 0
1 1 p q 0
p p p 0 0
q q 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
→ 1 p q 0
1 1 p q 0
p 1 1 q q
q 1 1 1 p
0 1 1 1 1
δ
1 1
p p
q q
0 0
Like P4, Q4 is not a hoop since p · (p→ q) = 0 6= q = q · (q → p). Q4 is involutive.
Our final example of a pocrim that is not a hoop, which we callQ6, has 6 elements
1 > r > s > t > u > 0. Its operation tables are as follows:
· 1 r s t u 0
1 1 r s t u 0
r r r t t u 0
s s t t t 0 0
t t t t t 0 0
u u u 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
→ 1 r s t u 0
1 1 r s t u 0
r 1 1 s s u 0
s 1 1 1 r u u
t 1 1 1 1 u u
u 1 1 1 1 1 s
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
δ
1 1
r 1
s s
t s
u u
0 0
Q6 is not involutive, e.g., because δ(r) = 0. As indicated by the block decomposition
of the operation tables, there is a homomorphism h : Q6 → Q4. The kernel congru-
ence of h has equivalence classes {1, r}, {s, t}, {u} and {0} which are mapped by h
to 1, p, q and 0 inQ4 respectively.
The next lemma gives the examples mentioned in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.
Lemma 25 The following hold in the indicated pocrims:
(i) In Q4, δ(δ(p) · δ(q)) = 0 6= 1 = δ(δ(p) · δ(q));
(ii) In P4, δ(δ(c)→ c)) = b 6= 1.
Proof: Straightforward calculations using the operation tables.
If P is a pocrim, we write Th(P), for the theory of P, i.e., the set of all formulas
A such that P |= A. If P is finite, then, given A, it is a finite task to decide whether
P |= A. So Th(P) is recursive and hence is a recursively axiomatisable extension of
ALi. In our final theorem, we give two theories that justify Theorem 6 together with
explicit descriptions of their classical extensions.
Theorem 26 Let A1 = Th(Q6) andA2 = Th(P4), then
(i) (·)Gli is a negative translation forA1 but (·)
Gen
is not;
(ii) (·)Gen is a negative translation forA2 but (·)
Gli
is not.
Moreover we haveA1 + [DNE] = Th(Q4) andA2 + [DNE] = Th(L3).
Proof: See [2, Theorem 5.2.5 and Lemma 5.2.6].
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